Secure, dependable and publicly verifiable distributed data storage in unattended wireless sensor networks by Ren, Wei et al.
. RESEARCH PAPERS .
SCIENCE CHINA
Information Sciences
May 2010 Vol. 53 No. 5: 964–979
doi: 10.1007/s11432-010-0096-7
c© Science China Press and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010 info.scichina.com www.springerlink.com
Secure, dependable and publicly verifiable
distributed data storage in unattended
wireless sensor networks
REN Wei1∗, REN Yi2 & ZHANG Hui3
1School of Computer Science, China University of Geosciences (Wuhan), Wuhan 430074, China;
2Department of Information and Communication Technology, University of Agder (UiA), Norway;
3Department of Electronics, Politecnico di Torino (POLITO), Italy
Received July 13, 2009; accepted February 3, 2010; published online April 7, 2010
Abstract In unattended wireless sensor networks (UWSNs), sensed data are stored locally or at designated
nodes and further accessed by authorized collectors on demand. This paradigm is motivated by certain scenarios
where historical or digest data (e.g., average temperature in a day), instead of real-time data, are of interest.
The data are not instantly forwarded to a central sink upon sensing, thereby saving communication energy for
transmission. Such a paradigm can also improve data survivability by making use of distributed data storage
in cheap ﬂash memory on nodes. However, the security and dependability of such data storage are critical for
the future data accessibility in UWSNs. To address this issue, we propose a secure and dependable distributed
storage scheme for UWSNs. Our scheme takes advantages of both secret sharing and Reed-Solomon code,
which can achieve computational security and maintain low communication overhead in terms of shortened data
dispersing size. We also propose a general coding method to publicly verify data integrity in a distributed
manner, with low communication and storage overhead, and without the need of holding original data. The
extensive analysis justiﬁes that our scheme can provide secure, dependable and publicly veriﬁable distributed
data storage in UWSNs even in the presence of node compromise and Byzantine failure.
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1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of a large number of sensor nodes that can be easily deployed
to various environments. The sensor nodes usually generate a large amount of data over their lifetime
to report or record the environmental context. Data storage in WSNs mainly falls into two categories,
namely centralized data storage and distributed data storage [1]. In the former case, data are sensed,
processed, aggregated and managed at a central location, usually a sink. In the latter case, after a sensor
node has generated some data, the node stores the data locally or at some designated nodes within the
network, instead of immediately forwarding the data to a centralized location out of the network [2–4].
Such a paradigm is called “Unattended WSNs” (UWSNs) [2].
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UWSNs paradigm is motivated by scenarios whereby not real-time information, but digest information
is of interest. The digest information includes historical summarization or locally extracted results on data
processing, such as the average temperature during last three months; the highest and lowest humidity
degree during last 24 h; or more speciﬁcally, the average concentration of a chemical element in soil during
last half year [5]. The digest information is provided on demand upon user’s retrieval, avoiding frequent
data transmission to sinks. It thus remarkably saves the communication energy. Moreover, there exist
some scenarios that may not be convenient for deploying robust real-time sinks, e.g. in the sea, volcano,
or places far away from collectors. The data have to be stored locally or in designated nodes in the
network and wait for further collection.
Security and dependability of the stored data in UWSNs are of paramount importance for their func-
tionality. The reasons are listed as follows: 1) As sensor nodes are exposed to unattended environment,
data may be lost due to failure of sensor nodes, such as power depletion, melting, corroding or getting
smashed; 2) data may be stolen or modiﬁed by mobile adversaries [6] that can compromise a selective
subset of sensor nodes. Hence, a fault-tolerant and compromise-resilient scheme for distributed data
storage has to be in position to ensure data availability, integrity and conﬁdentiality.
The straightforward data redundancy or fault-tolerant methods for data availability cannot be applied
in UWSNs domain that has resource constraints. Besides, a naive way to check the data integrity of
distributed data by hash value is also not appropriate. More precisely, the hash values of the distributed
data are stored at an integrity checker or veriﬁer, and the checker sends requests to data holders to
launch a check. If the computed hash values of returned data do not match stored hash values, the
data are modiﬁed, thus obviously incurring high communication overhead due to the overwhelming data
communications. It also induces remarkable storage overhead as the checker has to store a large volume
of hash values. Especially, such a checking method is not reliable as the checker is a single point of failure.
Hence, a lightweight method for data integrity check with distributed public veriﬁcation is mandatory.
Currently, UWSNs paradigm, especially its security issues attract more and more attentions in research
communities [2–5, 7, 8]. Nevertheless, security, dependability, and integrity veriﬁability of distributed
data storage still require thorough exploration and tailored design.
Objective of the paper: The goal of this paper is to investigate techniques for achieving the secure
and dependable distributed data storage as well as lightweight and public veriﬁability of integrity for
UWSNs.
Contributions: 1) In this paper, we propose a secure and dependable data distributed storage scheme
by making use of secret sharing and Reed-Solomon code. Such a scheme is resilient for random fault
and node compromise, with communication and storage eﬃciency maintained. 2) We present a generic
technique called two granularity linear code (TGLC), which can verify distributed data’s integrity publicly
and eﬃciently, i.e., in a distributed manner and with low communication and storage overhead without
original data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The network assumption, adversary model and
design goals are presented in section 2. Section 3 presents some preliminaries on secret sharing and
error correcting code. Section 4 proposes the data storage scheme. The extensive performance analyzes
and security analysis are given in section 5. Section 6 proposes a lightweight coding method for public
veriﬁability of data integrity. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Problem formulation
2.1 Network assumptions
We consider a sensor network that is composed of a large number of sensor nodes with unique ID, and
many users or collectors can access the data in the network on demand. Following the previous works
on distributed storage in WSNs (e.g. Unattended WSNs [2, 7], Storage-Centric WSNs [3], Data Centric
WSNs [9], In-Situ Data Storage WSNs [5], etc.), we assume that each sensor node has certain capacity
to store data. (The Gigabyte memory for sensor node is already available [10, 11].) Once the sensing
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data are generated at sensor nodes, they will be stored locally for future retrieval. The stored data will
be accessed by authorized users, instead of sensor nodes, e.g., the soldiers with laptop in a battleﬁeld.
The collected data may also be further processed together at in-door workstations or powerful hand held
devices that have no computational constraints. We assume that the pairwise shared key between any
two nodes can be established easily, e.g., by employing the key establishment scheme [12].
2.2 Attack model
The UWSNs impose some attacks in many ways. In this paper, we focus on the attackers who attempt
to eavesdrop, physically corrupt, modify, and capture the stored data in networks. The attackers thus
have the following capabilities:
(1) The attackers can eavesdrop on all the traﬃcs in UWSNs.
(2) The attackers may randomly select some sensor nodes to physically corrupt them (such as smash,
melt or corrode), or sensor nodes fail due to power depletion. In this occasion, the nodes totally lose the
functionality.
(3) The attackers can compromise some sensor nodes, and then modify the data stored in the nodes.
This type of attacker can further be categorized into two classes: 1) The adversary compromises the node
to pry or modify some data and then leave. 2) The adversary compromises the node and comes back
periodically or occasionally for some purposes. The left type is the most advanced adversary who resides
at compromised nodes for a long term, which acts normally in data storage stage but malfunctions at
data submission stage. They can be easily detected upon data retrieval and thus are out of the scope of
this paper.
2.3 Design goal
Our design goal is to provide the security and dependability of data storage in the presence of afore-
mentioned attacks. We focus on the security in terms of data conﬁdentiality and integrity, and the
dependability in the sense of the tolerance of random fault and the resilience of security compromise.
That is, if a random fault occurs, the data still can be recovered by the user upon request, and data
conﬁdentiality and integrity are retained. Also, if some nodes are compromised, the data modiﬁcation is
still detectable and data secrecy is still protected. Meanwhile, to defend the eavesdropping attack, data
have to be encrypted in transmission.
2.4 Evaluation metrics
The basic security requirements are satisﬁed as follows: 1) Data conﬁdentiality. Data are encrypted and
only authenticated users can access it. 2) Data integrity. If data are modiﬁed by attackers, they can be
detected by users. 3) Data availability. The stored in-networking sensed data can be retrieved correctly
upon request.
The performance evaluation includes the storage, communication, and computation consumption.
The dependability is evaluated in two folders: 1) Compromise resilience. Provided that some nodes
are compromised by attackers, data integrity and conﬁdentiality can be achieved. 2) Fault tolerance. In
the case of the random faults in the data, the original data can be recovered by the authenticated users.
The energy consuming has three parts: communication, storage and computation. Communication
costs much more energy than storage. For example, transmitting data over radio channel consume 200
times more energy than storing the same amount of data locally on a sensor node [13]. Radio reception
costs 500 times more energy than reading the same amount of data from local storage [10]. Computation
cost depends on the calculation involved. Simple arithmetic operations such as addition or multiplication
may have relatively low cost due to the powerful processor in the new generation sensor node [14, 15].
Therefore, we pay more attention to the communication cost.
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3 Preliminary
3.1 Secret sharing
Shamir [16] proposed an (m,n) secret sharing scheme based on polynomial interpolation, in which m of
n shares are required to reconstruct the secret.
Shamir’s secret sharing: The secret k is in Zp (p is prime, and p > n). Each shareholder i is in
the set P (|P | = n). All mathematical operations are in the Finite Field Zp. To distribute k, select
a polynomial a(x) with degree m − 1 and constant term k. Generate a share si for each i in P with
a(x): si = k +
∑m−1
j=1 aji
j . si is also in Zp. To reconstruct k, retrieve m coordinate pairs (i, si) of
all i in authorized subset B of P (|B| = m) and use the pairs in the Lagrange interpolation formula:
k =
∑
i∈B bisi, where bi =
∏
j∈B,j =i
j
j−i .
3.2 Reed-Solomon codes
A (k, n) erasure code encodes a block of data into n fragments, which has 1/k size of the original block,
so that any k can be used to reconstruct the original block. An example of such erasure coding schemes
is Reed-Solomon codes [17].
Reed-Solomon codes : For q  n, let α1, . . . , αn be n distinct elements of Galois Field GFq . The Reed-
Solomon codes of message length k, with parameters α1, . . . , αn is deﬁned as follows: Associate with a
messagem = 〈m0, . . . ,mk−1〉 a polynomial M(x) =
∑k−1
j=0 mjx
j . The encoding ofm is the evaluation of
M at the n given points, i.e., Encode(m) = 〈M(α1), . . . ,M(αn)〉. By construction, the Reed-Solomon
codes have message length k and block length n. The message can be reconstructed from any k blocks,
and the codes can correct up to t = n−k+12  errors.
4 Proposed data storage scheme
In this section, we propose a family of schemes for secure and dependable data storage.
4.1 Notation
Suppose there are x sensor nodes in UWSNs. They are formulated as an undirected graph G(V,E). The
node set is V = {v1, v2, . . . , vx} and the edge set is E = {e1, e2, . . . , ey}. The node is denoted by vi
(1  i  x). The node vi has di neighbors, which compose a set SETi. The distributed data may be
called Shares, to distinguish it from the original sensed data.
We list some major notations used in following sections in Table 1.
4.2 Basic setting
After sensor node vi senses data Datai, the listed steps begin to protect the data integrity and data
conﬁdentiality if the data are stored individually and locally:
(1) Generate a random session key RSK.
(2) Compute the keyed hash value of Datai using key RSK. The hash value, denoted by MAC =
h(Datai‖RSK), protects data integrity.
(3) Encrypt {Datai‖MAC} using key RSK. The encrypted data, denoted by {Datai‖MAC}RSK ,
protect data conﬁdentiality.
(4) Encrypt random session key RSK using symmetric key between sensor vi and user u, or public
key of a user u. Both are possible, depending on the underlying key management scheme, which is
independent of our work. Because the public key does not concern the node compromising, and public
key system is already possible in sensor networks, we assume the public key is used hereby, which is
denoted by PKu. We denote the encryption of random session key RSK by {RSK}PKu.
Therefore, the sensed data are equipped with the protection of data integrity and data conﬁdentiality.
Datai is equipped into DTai = {{Datai‖MAC}RSK‖{RSK}PKu}. Only authorized users can decrypt
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Table 1 Notations
vi sensor node with ID i
SETi node i’s neighbors
Datai data sensed by node vi
Ki,j pairwise secret key between vi and vj
PKu collector(user)’s public key
RSK random session key
Si the distributed data shares with ID i
out RSK using corresponding private key upon receiving DTai, and then decrypt out the original data,
and check data integrity through hash value.
4.3 Replication based scheme (RepS)
It is known that to store the data individually is not dependable. If the node is compromised or physically
attacked, all data in the node will be lost. One way to improve the dependability is thus to replicate the
data and distribute the replicas to the neighbors. If some nodes are compromised or physically attacked,
the data can still be retrieved from the other nodes that store the replica. We thus present a replication
based scheme (RepS) for distributed data storage as a baseline.
Scheme: vi randomly selects n nodes in SETi. For each node (e.g. vj), vi distributes one replica of
data St = DTai. To diﬀerentiate the data, the packet includes the vi and seqno.
vi → vj : {vi‖seqno‖St}, t ∈ [1, n], t ∈ Z.
The user collects data DTai from any one of n nodes that store the replica, decrypts it, and veriﬁes
the data integrity.
Analysis : Compared with individual storage, RepS does not improve the security but improve the
dependability on fault tolerance. However, it induces much communication and storage overhead. More
preciously, for n-replica scheme, the communication and storage overhead are both |DTai| ∗ n.
4.4 Secret sharing based scheme (SSBS)
We observe that performance and dependability of RepS scheme can be further improved. For example, it
is desirable to avoid the public key encryption operations in RepS (and in individual storage). Moreover,
RepS is not dependable if a user is compromised or corresponding private key is exposed, attackers who
capture only one replica can reveal the original sensed data. In contrast, secret sharing scheme can
encode the sensed data into many shares to protect the conﬁdentiality without inducing any encryption
operation. Moreover, even if one user is compromised, the sensed data still cannot be revealed if the
number of captured shares is less than a threshold value. Hence, to further improve the dependability of
data storage with compromise resilience, we propose SSBS scheme (secret sharing based distributed data
storage).
Scheme:
(1) vi employs (m,n) secret sharing scheme to encode data DTbi = {Datai‖MAC}RSK‖RSK} into
n shares, denoted by S1, . . . , Sn;
(2) vi randomly selects n, (n < |SETi|) neighbors in SETi, e.g. vj ∈ SETi, and distributes one
randomly selected distinct share to vj by using pairwise secret key Ki,j to encrypt the packet.
vi → vj : {vi‖seqno‖St}Ki,j , t ∈ [1, n], t ∈ Z.
The user collects m shares in the nodes, reconstructs the DTbi using Lagrange interpolation, decrypts it
and checks data integrity.
Example: Suppose DTbi has 2 bytes and uses (6, 8) secret sharing scheme to generate 8 shares. Suppose
ﬁeld Z65537 is selected (65537 > 216). Select random polynomial a(x) with degree 5 and constant term
DTbi. Generate a share Si for each i ∈ [1, 8], i ∈ Z. Si = DTbi + a1i + a2i2 + · · ·+ a5i5. All operations
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are in ﬁeld Z65537. The distributed shares are Si. Thus, each 6 in 8 shares can recover the DTbi by
Lagrange interpolation.
Analysis : SSBS improves the performance and dependability of RepS due to the properties of secret
sharing. Secret sharing can provide perfect conﬁdentiality of the secret in the sense of information-
theoretical security. For (m,n) secret sharing, any shares less than m have completely uncertainty about
the secret (i.e., DTbi). Therefore, even if more than one node is compromised, the attacker still cannot
reveal the data without enough shares.
In scheme SSBS, the length of distributed data shares is always shorter than that in RepS, as RSK is
always shorter than {RSK}PKu. However, it confronts the same undesirable storage and communication
overhead because in both RepS and SSBS, the distributed share size equals original data size (namely
DTai or DTbi). Moreover, the decreased computational overhead is public key encryption. The additional
overhead is computation overhead for secrete sharing, which has O(n∗m) modular exponential operations,
and data encryption for transmission. The computational cost of the data reconstruction from shares is
omitted since the authorized users can reconstruct the data at workstation which is supposed to have no
computational constraints, as pointed out in network assumption section.
Lou [18] proposed a multi-path routing based on threshold secret sharing scheme to provide data
conﬁdentiality without encryption for mobile ad hoc networks. It uses the same technique as SSBS for
conﬁdentiality, but later we will show that such a scheme can be further improved by inducing Reed-
Solomon code.
4.5 Advanced hybrid scheme (HybridS)
To further improve storage and communication eﬃciency of SSBS scheme without loss of security and
dependability, we notice that erasure code can reduce space and bandwidth overheads of redundancy in
fault-tolerant data storage [19, 20]. We thus propose HybridS — a scheme based on secret sharing and
erasure coding, which takes the advantages of both erasure code and secret sharing.
Parameter setup: Select n neighbors to distribute shares. To reconstruct data, m shares are required.
Let γ ∗ n = m, where γ is a security parameter (e.g., 0.5 ∼ 0.8). If γ is larger, a higher percentage of
shares is required for the reconstruction of the data. Recall that DTbi = {{Datai‖MAC}RSK‖RSK},
denoted by {E‖RSK}, where E = {{Datai‖MAC}RSK}.
Share generation:
(1) vi employs (m,n) secret sharing scheme to encode RSK into n shares, denoted by S1, . . . , Sn.
(2) vi employs (m,n) Reed-Solomon coding scheme to encode E into n shares. We denote the shares
by S1, . . . , Sn. More speciﬁcally, vi divides E into m parts, and selects
M(x) = E0 + · · ·+ Em−1xm−1.
Let x = α, α2, . . . , αn, (α is the primitive element in GF (2q), n  2q − 1). Let St = M(αt), (t =
1, 2, . . . , n).
Share distribution: vi randomly selects n neighbors in SETi (e.g. vj), and distributes one randomly
selected distinct share St and St, t ∈ [1, n] to vj by using pairwise secret key Ki,j to encrypt the packet.
vi → vj : {vi‖seqno‖St‖St}Ki,j , (t = 1, . . . , n).
Data reconstruction: The user collects m shares in nodes and reconstructs RSK and E, and then
reconstructs {DTbi} using Lagrange interpolation, decrypts the data, and checks data integrity.
Example: We give a trivial example to explain the main idea in above procedures. Node vi distributes
DTbi = {E‖RSK} using (6,8) scheme. Suppose E has 12 bytes and RSK has 2 bytes. Use (6,8) secret
sharing scheme to share RSK to generate shares Si (1  i  8). Use (6,8) Reed-Solomon code to encode
E. More speciﬁcally, vi divides E into 6 pieces: E = {E0‖ · · · ‖E5}. Each piece thus has 2 bytes. Let
Zq = Z65537 and M(x) = E0 +E1x+ ...+E5x5. Let x = 1, . . . , 8 and calculate M(x). All operations are
in ﬁeld Zq. The shares are Si = M(i) (1  i  8). Select a share from Si and a share from Si as a share
unit. Distribute unit shares to 8 neighbor nodes. In the end, each 6 in 8 shares can recover the data E
and RSK.
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Analysis : The communication and storage overhead of HybridS is much lower than SSBS. More
preciously, in (m,n) enhanced secret sharing scheme, the storage and communication overhead are
O(n ∗ ( |E|m + |RSK|)), where |E| + |RSK| = |DTbi|. The total computational complexity for coding
is roughly 2 times those of SSBS. Besides, the security and dependability of HybridS are as same as those
of SSBS.
Discussion:
1) To further improve the security and dependability, the distributed data can be generated with
diﬀerent security parameters by using heuristics information, e.g., the energy status of the sensing node
and the importance of the sensing data.
2) The security of RSK can be further improved by using multi-level secret sharing method [21], which
distinguishes the importances of diﬀerent shares with same share length for RSK reconstruction. For
example, more important shares are distributed to safer nodes.
3) As many data retrieval schemes propose aggregative data collection, our scheme is also able to be
compatible in this situation by replacing the naive secrete sharing scheme to homomorphic secret sharing
scheme [22].
5 Analysis of secure and dependable storage
In this section, we analyze the performance, security and dependability properties of the proposed RepS,
SSBS, and HybridS schemes. As the attack model is deﬁned earlier, our security analysis will focus on
the data that are modiﬁed or destroyed by random fault or mobile adversaries.
5.1 Performance analysis
We summarize comparisons between RepS (n-Replication), SSBS ((m,n) secret sharing) and HybridS
((m,n) enhanced secret sharing) in Table 2. Table 3 shows quantitative performance analysis in terms
of storage, communication and computation overhead. As justiﬁed in section 2.4, the communication
cost is most important. We can draw the conclusion that HybridS attains the best performance owing
to the communication overhead (more speciﬁcally, the length of shares) and achieves the highest level of
security and dependability.
5.2 Security analysis
Proposition 1. Even if adversaries compromise data holders and resides afterwards to corrupt the
data (i.e., the most advanced adversary), the sensed data can still be able to reconstruct original data
upon the ﬁrst request with the probability (n(1−pm))!(n−m)!n!(n(1−pm)−m)! , assuming n(1 − pm)  m, where pm is the
percentage of compromised nodes.
Proof. If the data are retrieved from the data holder without adversary I, the data can be reconstructed.
Such combination is Cmn(1−pm). The total combinations of retrieved holders are C
m
n . Therefore, the
probability of successfully retrieving the data upon the ﬁrst request is
Cmn(1−pm)
Cmn
=
(n(1− pm))!(n−m)!
n!(n(1 − pm)−m)! .
Proposition 2. If majority voting is used for determining the ﬁnal result, the probability that the
voting result is valid in a round is
Cun′ + C
u−1
n′ C
1
n−n′ + · · ·+ C
u
2 +1
n′ C
u2 −1
n−n′
Cun
,
where n′ = n(1− pm).
Proof. The proof is straightforward.
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Table 2 Comparisons between data distribution schemes
Scheme Security Dependability Overhead
Individual yes no no
Individual⇒RepS same improved increased
RepS⇒SSBS improved improved decreased
SSBS⇒HybridS same same decreased
Table 3 Quantitative analysis between data distribution schemesa)
Scheme Storage Communication Computation
Overhead Overhead Overhead
RepS n|DTai| cn|DTai| AE
SSBS n|DTbi| cn|DTbi| nmME +nSE
HybridS n(
|E|
m
+ |RSK|) cn( |E|
m
+ |RSK|) 2nmME+nSE
a) ME: Modular exponential; SE: symmetric encryption; AE: asymmetric encryption; |DTai| = |{{Datai‖MAC}RSK
‖{RSK}PKu}|; |DTbi| = |{{Datai‖MAC}RSK‖RSK}| = |E|+ |RSK|; c is the communication cost for 1 bit.
5.3 Dependability analysis
Fault-tolerant :
Proposition 3. The (m,n) HybridS scheme can reconstruct original data if the number of failure
nodes in n is smaller than threshold value m. The probability of guaranteeing data reconstruction in the
presence of random Byzantine failure is
Pfault-tolerant = 1−
∑
mtn
Ctnp
t
f (1− pf )n−t,
where pf is the probability that a node has random failure and m  n.
Proof. Straightforward.
Figure 1 depicts the analysis results of some (m,n) parameters.
Compromise-resilient :
Proposition 4. Adversaries have to compromise enough nodes in the UWSNs to reveal the original
data and damage the conﬁdentiality. For the (m,n) HybridS Scheme, the adversaries have to compro-
mise m nodes from n nodes. If the probability that one node is compromised is pc, the probability of
guaranteeing data conﬁdentiality in the presence of node compromise is
Pcompromise-resilient = 1−
∑
mtn
Ctnp
t
c(1− pc)n−t,
where pc is the probability that a node is compromised and m  n.
Proof. Straightforward.
6 Coding method for checking data integrity
In previous presentations, sensor node distributes encoded data to neighbor nodes in a secure and depend-
able manner. The next problem that arises naturally is how to check the data integrity in a lightweight
fashion. As the naive hash based scheme is not desirable and distributed public veriﬁcation is required
for dependability, in this section, we propose a lightweight scheme based on our summarized generic
technique.
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Figure 1 Probability of data reconstruction in presence of random fault.
6.1 TGLC coding method
We employ a two-granularity linear code to check distributed data integrity without original data in a
lightweight manner.
Definition 1. Intra-data linear code (Intra-code) is calculated in data using algebraic function:
Gα(x) =
k∑
i=1
αi−1xi, (1)
where each datum x has k symbols, denoted by xi. The symbol length is f . α is a primitive number in
GF (2q). Besides, q = f and k  2q − 1.
Definition 2. Inter-data linear code (Inter-code) is calculated among data using algebraic function:
P(y1, y2, . . . , yn) =
n∑
i=1
βi−1yi, (i ∈ [1, n]), (2)
where each datum yi(i ∈ [1, n]) has k symbols. The symbol length is f , and β is a primitive number in
GF (2q). Also, q = f and n  2q − 1.
Theorem 1. The Intra-code’s Inter-code equals Inter-code’s Intra-code.
Proof. Consider data S1, S2, . . . , Sn, each of which has k symbols, denoted by Sj = {x1,j, x2,j , . . . , xk,j}.
The symbol length is f . α and β are primitive numbers in GF (2q). Besides, q = f and k, n  2q − 1.
(1) The Inter-code of S1, S2, . . . , Sn is P =
∑n
j=1 β
j−1Sj . Denote the k symbols of P by Pi, i ∈ [1, k].
Then
Pi =
n∑
j=1
βj−1xi,j , i ∈ [1, k].
(2) The Inter-code’s Intra-code is
Gα(P ) =
k∑
i=1
αi−1Pi =
k∑
i=1
αi−1
( n∑
j=1
βj−1xi,j
)
.
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(3) The Intra-code of data Sj , j ∈ [1, n] is Gα(Sj), j ∈ [1, n]. We have
Gα(Sj) =
k∑
i=1
αi−1xi,j , (j ∈ [1, n]).
(4) The Inter-code of Intra-code Gα(Sj), j ∈ [1, n] is
P(Gα(S1), . . . ,Gα(Sj)) =
n∑
j=1
βj−1Gα(Sj) =
n∑
j=1
βj−1
( k∑
i=1
αi−1xi,j
)
.
(5) Due to the property of ﬁeld and linear coding in GF (2q), we have
n∑
j=1
βj−1
( k∑
i=1
αi−1xi,j
)
=
k∑
i=1
αi−1
( n∑
j=1
βj−1xi,j
)
.
Intra-code is calculated by data holders; Inter-code is calculated by data distributors and distributed
to veriﬁers. For simplicity of description, we call Intra-code diGest and Inter-code Parity in the rest of
the paper.
By choosing multiple α, the single Intra-code can be extended to multiple digests. Similarly, by
choosing multiple β, the single Inter-code can be extended to multiple parities.
Two Granularity Linear Code used for checking data integrity has two advantages as follows:
1) The checking is in a distributed manner. The veriﬁer who holds the parity can launch checking
by requesting the digests from the data holders, and then checking the integrity equation (in Theorem
1). The distributed checking thus is possible, and is more dependable. 2) Lightweight checking. The
involved communication is only digests that are much shorter than the original data or hash values. The
resulting computation is only algebraic functions that are computed much faster than hashing functions,
at both veriﬁers and holders.
6.2 TGLC based integrity checking
The steps for integrity checking are listed as follows:
(1) A distributor generates u parities using u randomly selected numbers: β1, β2, . . . , βu using eq. (2).
(2) The distributor distributes u parities to u veriﬁers.
(3) The veriﬁers who received the parity {Pj‖βj} can launch data integrity checking. That is, v
randomly selected numbers: α1, α2, . . . , αv as challenges and send them to distributed data holders.
(4) Each distributed data holder computes v digests using α1, α2, . . . , αv by eq. (1) and sends them
back to the veriﬁer.
(5) The veriﬁer computes the parities of the returned digests, calculates the digests of the parity, and
checks whether the equations hold:
Gαi(Pj) ?=
n∑
t=1
βt−1j Gαi(St), i ∈ [1, v].
If the v checking equations hold, the data integrity is maintained.
Figure 2 depicts the generation of the parities.
Implementation consideration: The Reed-Solomon codes, Secret Sharing and TGLC can all be eﬃ-
ciently implemented in the same Galois ﬁeld library. Thus, the implementation code can share the same
library. For example, Plank and Greenan et al. [23, 24] have already released fast Galois ﬁeld library for
arithmetic in GF (28), GF (216) and GF (232).
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Figure 2 u parities are generated from n data.
6.3 Analysis of integrity checking
Lemma 1. If v = 1 in the proposed scheme, only one digest is returned from each data holder. Suppose
one holder (denoted by d) holds data S. Suppose S is modiﬁed into S′. Once the holder d receives the
challenge {α‖v} (α ∈ GF (2q), v = 1), it returns digest Gα(S′). Suppose the digest of S for α is Gα(S).
The probability that the datum S is modiﬁed but the digest of data remains unchanged is
Pr{Gα(S) = Gα(S′), S = S′},
denoted by Pr1. That is,
Pr1 =
(2f + 1)k − k ∗ 2f − 1
(2fk − 1)2f .
Proof. Suppose the data S has k symbols, denoted by x0, x1, . . . , xk. The symbol length is f . (In fact,
we have q = f and k  2q − 1.) If v = 1, only one digest is returned, which is generated by
Gα(S) = x0 + αx1 + · · ·+ αk−1xk.
(1) If only one symbol in data is changed, the digest of data will be changed. For example, suppose
xi(i ∈ [1, k])) is changed to x′i. Then Gα(S′) = Gα(S), where Gα(S′) = x0 + · · ·+ αi−1x′i + · · ·+ αk−1xk.
(2) If two symbols are changed, the digest may be unchanged. For example, suppose xi1 and xi2
(i1, i2 ∈ [1, k]) are changed to x′i1 and x′i2 . The total number of pairs is 2f ∗ 2f , in which 2f pairs have
the digest Gα(S). Because for each x′i1 , there always exists an x′i2 such that
αi1−1x′i1 + α
i2−1x′i2 = α
i1−1xi1 + α
i2−1xi2 .
That is, the digest keeps unchanged. The number of such pairs is 2f , so the total occasions in which two
symbols are modiﬁed but the digest is unchanged is C2k2
f .
(3) Similarly to (2), if t (t ∈ [3, k]) symbols are changed, the occasions in which t symbols are modiﬁed
but the digest is still equal to Gα(S) is Ctk2(t−1)f .
(4) The total number of occasions where the data are modiﬁed is (2f )k − 1. (Each symbol has 2f
modiﬁcation occasions, and the data have k symbols in total. Besides, the occasion without modiﬁcation
is excluded.) Therefore, the probability that data are modiﬁed but the digest is unchanged is
Pr1 =
C2k2
f + C3k2
2f + · · ·+ Ckk2(k−1)f
2fk − 1 =
(2f + 1)k − k2f − 1
(2fk − 1)(2f ) .
Figure 3 depicts the generation of the parities.
In fact, Pr1 can be estimated by 2−f , because
Pr1 =
(2f + 1)k − k2f − 1
(2fk − 1)(2f) =
(1 + 2−f)k − k2−k − 2−kf
1− 2−fk (2
−f )
≈ ((1 + 2−f)k − k2−k)(2−f ) = (1 + 2−f)k2−f − k2−kf ≈ (1 + 2−f )k2−f ≈ 2−f .
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Figure 3 The probability that the data are modiﬁed but the digest is unchanged corresponds with the number of symbols
and the length of symbol.
Lemma 2. If v  2 in proposed scheme, v digests are expected to return from each data holder.
Suppose one holder (denoted by d) holds data S. Suppose S is modiﬁed into S′. Once the holder d receives
the challenge α1, . . . , αv, it returns digests Gαi(S′), (i = 1, . . . , v). The digests of S for αi, (i = 1, . . . , v)
are Gαi(S), (i = 1, . . . , v). The probability that the data S are modiﬁed but the digests of data remain
unchanged is
Pr{Gαi(S) = Gαi(S′), (i = 1, . . . , v), S = S′},
which is denoted by Pr2. That is,
Pr2 =
Cv+1k 2
f + Cv+2k 2
2f + · · ·+ Ckk2(k−v)f
2fk − 1 .
Proof. According to Lemma 1, only when the number of modiﬁed symbols in data is larger than v,
does the occasion that data is modiﬁed but v digests are unchanged become possible.
(1) If v + 1 symbols are modiﬁed, without loss of generality, we denote them by x1, x2, . . . , xv+1. The
diﬀerence between original data and modiﬁed data is Δx1,Δx2, . . . ,Δxv+1. We have⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 α1 α21 · · · αk−11
1 α2 α22 · · · αk−12
...
...
...
...
1 αu α2v · · · αk−1v
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Δx1
Δx2
...
Δxk
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
0
...
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (3)
The coeﬃcient matrix is a Vandermonde matrix with linear independence, and dimension v. Thus, 2f
solutions exist for eq. (3). So, the probability that the v + 1 symbols are modiﬁed but the v digests
remain unaltered is Cv+1k 2
f .
(2) Similarly to 1), the total occasions where the data are modiﬁed but the v digests remain unchanged
is
Cv+1k 2
f + Cv+2k 2
2f + · · ·+ Ckk2(k−v)f .
Because the total modiﬁcation occasions are (2f )k−1 (same reason as that for Lemma 1(4)), the resultant
probability that the data are modiﬁed but the v digests remain unaltered is
Pr2 =
Cv+1k 2
f + Cv+2k 2
2f + · · ·+ Ckk2(k−v)f
2fk − 1 .
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When k >> v, the Pr2 can be estimated by 2−vf , because
Cv+1k 2
f + Cv+2k 2
2f + · · ·+ Ckk2(k−v)f
2fk − 1 =
Cv+1k 2
−(k−1)f + Cv+2k 2
−(k−2)f + · · ·+ Ckk2−vf
1− 2−fk
≈ Cv+1k 2−(k−1)f + Cv+2k 2−(k−2)f + · · ·+ Ckk2−vf ≈ 2−vf .
Lemma 3. Suppose u = 1. Then the probability that the data Si’s digest is changed but the parity
remains unchanged is
Pr3 =
(2f + 1)n − n ∗ 2f − 1
(2fn − 1)2f .
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1, and similarly, Pr3 ≈ 2−f .
Lemma 4. Suppose u parities are distributed in the proposed scheme. The probability that the returned
digests are changed but the u parities still remain unchanged is
Pr4 =
Cu+1n 2
f + Cu+2n 2
2f + · · ·+ Cnn2(n−u)f
2fn − 1 .
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2, and similarly, when n >> u, Pr4 ≈ 2−uf .
Definition 3. The ealse negative rate (FNR) (R) is the probability that distributed data are modiﬁed,
but the checking result shows no data modiﬁcation due to the satisfaction of checking equations.
If the checking equations are not satisﬁed, we can draw the conclusion that the data is modiﬁed. If
the checking equations are satisﬁed, we claim that the data are not modiﬁed, but this claim is correct
only for the probability of 1− R. The FNR is possible due to the parameter selections. To ensure that
the R is small enough, we analyze R in diﬀerent parameter settings.
Theorem 2. Suppose one parity (u = 1) and one digest (v = 1) are employed. Then the proposed
scheme has R = C1n−1Pr1+C2n−1(Pr
2
1+(1−Pr1)2Pr3)+
∑n−1
z=3 C
z
n−1(Pr
z
1 +
∑z
i=2 C
i
zPr
z−i
1 (1 − Pr1)iPr3).
Proof. v = 1 indicates that only one digest is returned from the data holders; u = 1 implies that the
veriﬁer holds one parity. The veriﬁer receives n − 1 digests from n− 1 responding nodes, as the veriﬁer
itself holds one datum and can generate the digest. Upon receiving such n − 1 digests, the veriﬁer will
check the integrity equation. Recall that the checking equation is Gα(P1) ?= P1(Gα(S1), . . . ,Gα(Sn)) in
this case (u = v = 1).
If the modiﬁed data pass the checking equation, they must belong to one of two types: (Type-I) The
digests of the modiﬁed data equal the digests of the original data; (Type-II) Some digests of the modiﬁed
data are diﬀerent but the parity of all digests is the same as expected. Next, we categorize diﬀerent
modiﬁcation occasions, and analyze such two types for each occasion.
(1) Suppose one datum in n−1 is modiﬁed but undetected. If Type-I occurs (the digest is unchanged),
the probability is Pr1 according to Lemma 1. Type-II cannot occur because one changed digest deﬁnitely
results in the change of parity. Therefore, the probability that one datum is modiﬁed but the checking
equation is satisﬁed is C1n−1Pr1.
(2) Suppose two data in n − 1 are modiﬁed. If Type-I occurs, the probability that two digests are
unchanged is Pr21. If Type-II occurs, the probability that two digests are changed but their parity is
unchanged is (1 − Pr1)2Pr3. Therefore, the probability that two data are modiﬁed but the checking
equation is satisﬁed is C2n−1(Pr
2
1 + (1− Pr1)2Pr3).
(3) Suppose z (z ∈ [3, n − 1]) data in n are modiﬁed. Similarly, if Type-I occurs (all z digests are
unchanged), the probability that z is unchanged is Prz1. When Type-II occurs, the probability will be
further analyzed as follows:
Suppose i in z digests are changed but the parity is the same. Then its probability is CizPr
z−i
1 (1 −
Pr1)iPr3. Also, at least two digests must be changed to make the parity unchanged, so i ∈ [2, z]. The
probability that z digests are changed but parity is same can be computed by summation. That is,∑z
i=2 C
i
zPr
z−i
1 (1 − Pr1)iPr3.
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Therefore, the probability that z data are modiﬁed but undetected is
Czn−1
(
Prz1 +
z∑
i=2
CizPr
z−i
1 (1− Pr1)iPr3
)
, z ∈ [3, n− 1].
(4) In summary, the probability that the data is modiﬁed but undetected for proposed scheme with
u = v = 1 is the summation of (1), (2) and (3). That is,
R = C1n−1Pr1 + C
2
n−1(Pr
2
1 + (1 − Pr1)2Pr3) +
n−1∑
z=3
Czn−1
(
Prz1 +
z∑
i=2
CizPr
z−i
1 (1− Pr1)iPr3
)
.
Theorem 3. Suppose u parities and one digest (v = 1) are used. Then the proposed scheme has
R = C1n−1Pr1 +
∑u
i=2 C
i
n−1Pr
i
1 +
∑n−1
z=u+1 C
z
n−1(Pr
z
1 +
∑z
i=u+1 C
i
zPr
z−i
1 (1 − Pr1)iPr4).
Proof. We use the same setting in that of Theorem 2, and the proof is similar to Theorem 2.
(1) The probability that one datum in n is modiﬁed but undetected is C1n−1Pr1.
(2) Suppose z (z ∈ [2, u]) data are modiﬁed but undetected. If Type-I occurs, the probability that z
digests are unchanged is Prz1. When z < u, the parities of any changed z digests will be diﬀerent from
the original one. Hence Type-II cannot occur. The probability that z data in n are modiﬁed without
detection is Czn−1Pr
z
1.
(3) Suppose z (z ∈ [u + 1, n− 1]) data are modiﬁed but undetected. If Type-I occurs, the probability
that z digests are unchanged is Prz1. If Type-II occurs, the occasions are further analyzed in the following,
which is similar to (3) in Theorem 2.
Suppose i in z digests are changed but the u parities are the same. The probability that i digests
are changed but the u parities are the same is CizPr
z−i
1 (1 − Pr1)iPr4, and i ∈ [u + 1, z]. We thus can
compute the probability that z digests are changed but the u parities are the same by summation, which
is
∑z
i=u+1 C
i
zPr
z−i
1 (1− Pr1)iPr4.
Therefore, the probability that z data are modiﬁed but undetected is: Czn−1(Pr
z
1+
∑z
i=u+1 C
i
zPr
z−i
1 (1−
Pr1)iPr4).
(4) In summary, the probability that the data are modiﬁed but undetected for proposed scheme with
parameters u and v = 1 is
R = C1n−1Pr1 +
u∑
i=2
Cin−1Pr
i
1 +
n−1∑
z=u+1
Czn−1
(
Prz1 +
z∑
i=u+1
CizPr
z−i
1 (1− Pr1)iPr4
)
.
Theorem 4. Suppose u parities and v digests are used. Then the proposed scheme has R = C1n−1Pr2+∑u
i=2 C
i
n−1Pr
i
2 +
∑n−1
z=u+1 C
z
n−1(Pr
z
2 +
∑z
i=u+1 C
i
zPr
z−i
2 (1− Pr2)iPr4).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorems 2 and 3.
Theorem 5. The FNR R decreases exponentially corresponding to appropriately selected parameters.
Proof. As in Lemmas 1–4, Pr1 = Pr3 ≈ 2−f , Pr2 ≈ 2−vf , Pr4 ≈ 2−uf . According to the FNR R in
Theorems 2–4, R decreases exponentially from the selection of u = v = 1 to u > 1, v = 1 because Pr3 >
Pr4 exponentially, and from the selection of u > 1, v = 1 to u, v > 1 because Pr1 > Pr2 exponentially.
In previous analysis, we only discussed one-round checking situation. If the checking rounds increase in
number, the FNR will decrease exponentially. As is proven in Theorem 6, FNR can be further decreased
by adding checking rounds.
Theorem 6. The FNR after r rounds of integrity checking is Rr, where R is FNR for one round.
Proof. Suppose the proposed scheme checks r rounds. If in one of them the checking equations are not
satisﬁed, the proposed scheme can draw the conclusion that the data are modiﬁed. Such a conclusion
has zero false positive rate. If the checking equations are satisﬁed in all r rounds, the proposed scheme
claims that the data are not modiﬁed. The FNR after r rounds is Rr. The claim that the data integrity
is maintained is correct with the conﬁdence 1−Rr, which converges to 1 with the addition of r.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a secure and dependable data distributed storage scheme for in-networking
stored sensing data in UWSNs. To achieve the maximum of accessible data upon retrieval, we take
advantages of secret sharing and Reed-Solomon code, without loss of computational security and with low
communication and storage overhead. The extensive analysis on performance, security and dependability
veriﬁed that our scheme performs well even in the presence of node compromise and Byzantine failure.
Besides it remains eﬃcient in terms of storage, communication and computation owing to shortened
distributed data size.
Furthermore, we presented a generic coding method called Two Granularity Linear Code to eﬃciently
check data integrity. It consists of Intra-code and Inter-code that can be computed commutatively. Such
a property provides inner linkage of distributed data via digests and parities with small size. It can
be applied to verify data integrity publicly in a distributed manner without original data. By making
use of TGLC, we have thus proposed a lightweight scheme for verifying distributed data integrity. The
extensive analysis has veriﬁed that the false positive of checking result is zero and the false negative
vanishes exponentially with appropriate coding parameters and checking rounds.
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